Abstract. Recent findings in cognitive science suggest that the epistemic subject is more complex and epistemically porous than is generally pictured. Human knowers are open to the world via multiple channels, each operating with its particular epistemic materials and according to its own logic. These findings need to be understood and addressed by the philosophical community. The current essay argues that one consequence of the new findings is to invalidate certain arguments for epistemic anti-realism.
Introduction
Here is a common view about how, in general, our epistemic cognition is structured: our senses deliver impulses of some kind that are arranged, synthesized or otherwise interpreted by large-scale cognitive structures to produce conceptually ordered beliefs.
Or, as Richard Rorty has put the matter: "Since Kant, we find it almost impossible not to think of the mind as divided into active and passive faculties, the former using concepts to 'interpret' what 'the world' imposes on the latter." (Rorty 1979 p. 3) Wha tever the merits of this view as history, it certainly seems an accurate characterization of the contemporary orthodoxy. Thus, Steven Pinker writes, When [organisms] apprehend the world by sight, they have to use the splash of light reflected off its objects, projected as a two dimensional kaleidoscope of throbbing, heaving streaks on each retina. The brain somehow analyzes the moving collages and arrives at an impressively accurate sense of the objects out there that give rise to them. . . . The selective advantage is obvious: animals that know where the food, the predators, and the cliffs are can put food in their stomachs, keep themselves out of the stomachs of others, and stay on the right side of the clifftop. (Pinker 1997 p.212-3) transforms sensory stimulation into an experienced description of the world by which we hope to fruitfully act and survive. 1 Thus stated, this orthodox view of the nature of perception-which I shall call the received view-clearly involves a number of distinct, implicit assumptions. It is worth trying to explicate these:
1. The brain or mind provides the active element of perception, while the senses are the passive recipients of 'stimulations'.
2. From the epistemic standpoint, 'sensory stimulation' describes a single class of event, regardless of the sensory modality involved. The raw characteristics of the signal and low-level details of the processing may be different for different sense modalities, but the overall logic of the processing, and therefore the epistemic import of the sensory stimulation, is identical in each case. Putting it differently: all perception works by analogy with vision.
3. In order to become a perceptual experience, or to sustain a cognitive attitude like belief, 'sensory stimulation' must be synthesized by inferential, conceptual, or other cognitive structures.
4. Conceptually synthesized sensory stimulation is our only mode of epistemic access to the world.
5. Perception has a single, unified function: to build a (conceptually informed) representation or description of the world.
6. This single, perceptually generated description of the world is the basis for all perceptually guided thought and action.
Of course, in gathering these various elements-gleaned from different theories and theorists-and making of them one view, one runs the risk of assembling a theory which no one in fact holds. Although it is not clear to me that it is useless to show something false that no one will admit to believing, there is in this case little reason for such concerns. For, to put it bluntly, every element of the received view is questionable. By way of illustration, consider just three examples: first of all, it has long been a staple of phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty 1962) , and has more recently been the focus of the enactive and embodied schools of cognitive science (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991; Clark 1997; Anderson 2003a ) that the sense organs can be active tools of exploration; the hand reaches out to grasp objects and brush surfaces, and likewise the eye does not wait for stimulation, but moves selectively and proactively about the scene. To understand the import of the 'stimulations', then, it is necessary to include as a factor the particular activity of the sense organ itself. Following out this line of reasoning, Kevin O'Regan and Alva Nöe make an interesting case for the role (and necessity) of the eye's activity in the processing of vision. According to their view, the output of the visual system is not a static picture or scene description, but rather a set of 'sensory-motor contingents'
describing the relation between changes in sensory stimulation and the movements of the eye, head, and perceived object. "Under the present view of what seeing is, the visual experience of a red color patch depends on the structure of the changes in sensory input that occur when you move your eyes around relative to the patch, or when you move the patch around relative to yourself." (O'Regan and Nöe 2001 sec. 5.7)
Second, against the notion that perceptual experience requires conceptual synthesis, proponents of nonconceptual content suggest that there may be an element in the experienced deliverances of perception that is not constrained, guided or informed by conceptual structures. This view appears to get some support from naïve introspection, as indeed it seems that the experienced content of perception is richer than any description one could make of it.
Theorists of nonconceptual content typically analyze this extra richness in terms of the skills, dispositions or nondiscursive knowledge an agent has in virtue of the perception in question. (Evans 1985; Chrisley 1995; Bermúdez 1995a; 1995b; Peacocke 1998; Gunther 2003) Finally, Andy Clark questions what he calls the Assumption of Experience-Based
Control: "that conscious visual experience provides the very information continuously used for visually based motor control." In contrast, he argues for the "deep and abiding dissociation between the contents of conscious seeing, in the one hand, and the resources used for the on-line guidance of action, on the other." (Clark 2001) These are but three examples, for the list of critiques of the received view is long and growing; see (Nöe and Tho mpson 2002a) for a nice collection of essays on the subject.
The current essay adds one more that growing list. Relying heavily on some recent work in cognitive science, I shall argue that, although the received view may accurately characterize one epistemic mode, human beings in fact have many; that each operates according to its own logic and for its particular purposes; and that each thereby produces or contributes to some element of our overall (but not necessarily centrally represented) knowledge of the world. As this essay relies largely on the same work by Milner and
Goodale cited by (Clark 2001) , my arguments bear some similarity to his. We are both attracted by the idea that a single perceptual system (in this case vision) can have multiple functions, and thus we both insist on the inadequacy on thesis (5), above.
However, whereas Clark's interest is to question (5) in the service of undermining (6), I
intend instead to use Milner and Goodale's critique of (5) to focus attention directly on thesis (4), and indirectly on (2) and (3). For, as I have already indicated, I believe that human beings are more epistemically porous than the received view allows.
In addition to being interesting and worth consideration in its own right, the multiple modes theory of our epistemic openness to the world has an immediate philosophical benefit: it undercuts an important premise of an age-old and frankly annoying (because both simplistic and convincing) argument for epistemic anti-realism. The work of this essay, then, is three-fold: first, to criticize the received view along the lines I have indicated; second, to begin to sketch (and in the current essay I can do no more than this) a substantial alternative picture; and third, to show how this alternative pic ture of our epistemic openness undermines at least one version of epistemic anti-realism. For the most part, these tasks will be pursued in parallel; but before the real work can begin, we must first present the argument for anti-realism it is my hope to undermine. Thus it is to this task that we now turn.
The lure of anti-realism (and how to resist it)
A common and apparently convincing class of argument for epistemic anti-realism starts precisely from the received view (or, more precisely, from one of its elements): our epistemic contact with the world is mediated by concepts or conceptual structures (cognitive, social, ethical, linguistic) , which interpret or structure the deliverances of our senses so as to provide our picture of the world. It is but a short step from here to the notion that it is these conceptual structures-and not the world itself-which determine the shape of experienced reality. 2 After all, isn't it obvious that people approaching the world with significantly different sets of conceptual schema will thereby understand the world differently? And does it not follow that the shape of this understanding is determined by the conceptual schema here employed, and not-most importantly-by the world (even assuming that "the world" has an una mbiguous referent)? For according to this view, all of our epistemic contact with the world is accounted for by sensation, and yet epistemic content is determined by concepts.
3 It has become a truism that one cannot "step outside" one's concepts to see the world as it is; yet without the possibility of verification this would provide, there seems to be no basis for the judgment that our concepts accurately reflect the structure of the world. Thus, in the absence of some other account of how the world can limit, direct, and change these concepts, it must follow that the phenomenological order-the "world" of our experience-is epistemically closed. Certainly, this conclusion has seemed obvious, or at least inevitable, to many thinkers.
And I find myself agreeing: if we were the way the received view supposes, this would be the way things were for us. But we are not (I will argue), and, therefore . . . here I am tempted to say, "things are not", but of course I am-or will be-entitled only to the conclusion that we are not forced, by our best judgment of how we are, to adopt this particular anti-realist picture of how things are.
But what warrants my adherence to realism? Well, it may well be that there is nothing to say to one who one wants, or judges it perfectly natural, to be a thoroughgoing idealist; it is certain that I have nothing to say. For idealists don't deny the possibility of knowing the world-quite the opposite; their (to my mind strange) metaphysics is meant precisely to account for the possibility of knowledge. However, my quarrel is not with idealism, but rather with anti-realism, and it is my general impression that anti-realists aren't idealists-that is, they do not accept the relevant metaphysics, positing the existence of a single, immaterial, substance (ideas) from which everything is composed. Rather, they are either metaphysical realists-there is some real (material) stuff out there, we just lack the epistemic acuity to (here is one place where a "really" might be inserted) know what it is (and here is another) like-or, perhaps in some cases, metaphysical agnostics-there may be some real (material) stuff out there, we just lack the epistemic acuity to ("really")
know whether/what it ("really") is. These two metaphysical flavors of anti-realism are identical in positing a knowing subject confronting an alien reality, but prevented from grasping that reality by conceptual structures which, however flexibly they may be bent to the shape of the world, still intrude their impervious bulk between us and that which we seek to know. All this is to say that anti-realism, as defended by its contemporary adherents, is an epistemological thesis. Beginning from such suppositions about how knowing works, the anti-realist swiftly concludes that the world, as such, is unknowable (Goodman 1978; Putnam 1984; Rorty 1979; . I think it is fair to say that this conclusion is problematic, and is in tension with both common sense and scientific claims that we are in touch with, and are able to learn about, the actual world.
Naturally, there have been numerous attempts to avoid this conclusion. Among the most influential have been (Davidson 1985) and (McDowell 1994) , who decry the scheme/content division this picture still seems to imply, and insist that, contrary to the received view, there are no epistemic mediators active in our contact with the world; our knowledge of the world, while conceptually structured, is not thereby conceptually mediated. Davidson argues that the very structure of interpretation-its required maximization of local and global coherence-guarantees that most of our beliefs are true.
This, Davidson suggests, when combined with the fact that world of our experience is always already conceptually structured, shows that there is no room for the notion that we could be incorrectly interpreting some independently defined entity. Once we give up on this idea that we can identify a set of concepts on the one hand, and an uninterpreted world on the other, it simply follows that skepticism (and anti-realism) is false. But few have found this convincing, and Davidson is generally understood to support some kind of internalism or coherentism, neither of which is a strong ally to realism. I myself find it hard to make sense of this distinction between conceptual structuring and conceptual mediation, and argued extensively in (O'Donovan-Anderson 1997) that, while it may avoid one particular version of skeptical relativism, in so far as it fails to provide an account of our epistemic openness, it must also fail to provide grounds for epistemic realism. 5 Even after Davidson's refutation of the third dogma of empiricism, the attraction to anti-realism remains.
Surely I am not the only one struck with wonder at this apparently intractable tendency to arrive at anti-realist conclusions, despite a general reluctance to do so, 6 the many convincing defenses of realism (Appiah 1996; Bilgrami 1992; Chisolm 1996; Devitt 1991; Leplin 1984; Smith 2002) , and the well-known problems with skepticism and anti-realism (Cortens 2000; Evans 1982; Gardiner 2000; Greco 2000; Huemer 2001; Norris 1997; Williams 1996; Wright 1988; . Such wondering has led me to conclude: thus will it ever be-arguments against the thesis of anti-realism will continue to be largely ineffective unless and until we can cast sufficient doubt on the suppositions, postulates and common notions that make the conclusion seem inevitable (on this point see also Williams 1996; Stroud 1984 
Two kinds of knowing in vision: the Milner-Goodale hypothesis
Although (Milner and Goodale 1995) In contrast, the dorsal stream (DS) is a specialized perceptual processing system that represents information in a form optimized for calculating and directing motor responses.
Information from this pathway is used to guide such things as the orientation not just of the sense organs for optimal perception or perceptual tracking (e.g. the visual grasp reflex), but also of the whole body to facilitate actions like reaching, grasping, and snapping at prey, which actions it also governs. The natural way to characterize what the agent knows in virtue of DS representations is the location, size, shape and orientation of an object, and how to get the agent-object relation into a preferred state. One might say that the DS places the object in an egocentric (and task-specific, see below) visuomotor space, or an egocentric action field, and the object is (re-)presented to the agent in these terms.
Fig. 1
Schematic diagram illustrating the two major visual processing streams. From (Milner and Goodale 1995) .
existence of "what" and "where" pathways (Schneider 1969; Ungerleider and Mishkin 1982) . According to this latter view, the two visual pathways are specialized for identifying objects by category or features, and for locating objects in space, respectively.
While not denying that the DS plays a role in fixing the location of objects, Milner and
Goodale emphasize that this localization of objects is only one of the many sub-functions which the DS serves in virtue of its role in visuomotor control. This clarification is important for two reasons: first, because it underlines the greater scope of the Milner- Furthermore, in a system specialized for visuomotor control of action, one would expect encoding of both "what" and "where" information about the target object, albeit specified in a way appropriate to action rather than high-level cognition. And evidence suggests that this is indeed the case:
Many of the cells studied by (Taira et al. 1990 ) were sensitive not only for the appearance of an object, but also for the appropriate motor act performed in grasping it. This motor information may reasonably be assumed to come from the rostral sector of inferior area 6 (area F5), a part of the frontal lobe known to be intimately connected with this part of the parietal lobe (Goldschalk et al. 1984; Matelli et al. 1986 ) and whence neurons project directly to the motor cortex (area 4). Cells in this premotor area include ones with motor and visuomotor properties associated with grasping behaviour (Rizzolatti et al. 1988 ) and (Sakata et al. 1992) proposed that they provide a feedback message to enable a 'matching' process between sensory input and motor output to take place in the parietal cortex. (p. 53)
The immediate point is that it is a mistake to imagine that one processing system (VS) is accounting for all the discrimination and classification ("what"-related) tasks, while the other (DS) in engaged only in spatial tracking ("where"-related) tasks. Rather each stream is identifying and classifying the objects in the world according to a set of categories most appropriate to its function, and in each case, therefore, it is legitimate to say that the objects are known in these terms. 11 This further underlines the main message of the current essay, that there is more than one epistemic mode, each operating according to its own logic and utilizing its preferred epistemic (sensory) materials. It is worth emphasizing, however, that although these two processing streams are functionally distinct, there is a great deal of anatomic interconnection and informational feedback between them. I will close this essay with some suggestions as to the epistemic import of this cooperation between the two processing streams.
Simple illustrations of the Milner-Goodale hypothesis
There is a large and growing body of evidence for the two visual systems hypothesis, which in some form or other has become a standard account of visual processing.
However, as the purpose of the current essay is not to establish nor to argue for the existence of separate visual processing streams, but rather to explore one of its implications, evidence for the hypothesis will be recounted only partially and briefly, and primarily with an eye to illustrating its significance. As is often the case in cognitive science, some of the most striking illustrations come from experiments with braindamaged patients.
Cortical blindness
Cortical blindness occurs when, although the eye and optic nerve are intact and functional, damage to V1 prevents its processing of visual information. Cortically blind patients report no visual experience, and are therefore unable to do such things as describe visual scenes. Given that V1 is the sole input source for VS processing, this deficit is to be expected. However, since the posterior parietal cortex has an alternate input pathway, through the superior colliculus and pulvinar (see fig. 1 ), one might expect some DS functionality to remain intact despite V1 lesions. And indeed, there is evidence for such 'blindsight' . Patient DB, for instance, can accurately point to a visual target, despite his insistence that he is unable to see it. )
Optic ataxia
In contrast, patients with lesions in the posterior parietal cortex, while able to describe the orientation and location of objects in space (Perenin and Vighetto 1988) , nevertheless show a number of impairments in reaching and grasping. For instance (Perenin and Vighetto 1983; 1988) recorded inaccuracies in the direction of reaching movements, and also a failure to correctly orient the hand in order to pass it through a slot. Similarly, the patient RV (Goodale et al. 1993) shows impairments in 'grip scaling'-the ability to preform the hand to the proper size and shape in order to grasp an object-as well as in judgments regarding where to position one's fingers so as to avoid having the object slip from one's grip ). This despite the fact that the relevant objects in each case were in plain view and could be accurately described.
Visual form agnosia
Visual form agnosia is a deficit in the ability to recognize and interpret shapes, resulting in difficulty in object and face recognition. Lower level visual abilities, such as color and texture recognition, are often preserved, allowing for the identification of some objects based on these characteristics (Humphrey et al. 1994 ). The condition is linked to occipital lobe damage, often following an anoxic episode, caused for instance by carbon monoxide poisoning. Patient DF, the most extensively studied visual form agnosic, shows bilateral necrosis in her lateral occipital cortex, the result of asphyxiation by a faulty water heater.
DF is not able to recognize line drawings of common objects, nor is she able to copy them. She is able to draw simplified versions of common objects from memory, although when later shown her own drawings, she cannot name the objects (Humphrey et al. 1994 ). 12 Despite these perceptual deficits, DF shows no impairment of typical visuomotor skills. She can accurately reach for and grasp objects, even those with complex shapes, and can catch a ball or a short wooden stick. In a particularly striking experiment, it was shown that DF is easily able to post a letter through differently oriented mail slots, despite being unable to report on the orientation either verbally or by matching the orientation-for instance by manually setting a comparison slot or by orienting the letter without moving to post it (Milner and Goodale 1995; Milner et al. 1991; Goodale et al. 1991) .
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Epistemic openness and the received view
It does appear that the received view may accurately describe the operation of ventral stream visual processing, for in this case it appears that sensory impulses are interpreted in terms of a set of explicitly conceptual structures which together determine the meaning and significance of the visual input, and allow us to perform such critical cognitive tasks as modeling the stable features of our environment. 14 Were this the whole story, it might be that the structure of our epistemic cognition would land us in epistemological quandaries of the sort earlier described. But, as we have seen, this is not the whole epistemic story, not even for vision. Instead, there is an additional visual system, which interprets and places objects not in an allocentric, conceptually structured cognitive space, but rather in an egocentric action field, in which objects are understood and presented in terms allowing the agent to appropriately select and guide actions taken towards, or with, the objects in question. As the examples of catching a ball or posting a letter indicate, this information involves not just static representations of the current scene, but also predictions of future states and expectations for the outcome of directed interventions.
This fact alone is enough to present a direct challenge to the anti-realist; at the very least he (and indeed, any philosopher interested in human knowledge) is called upon to assimilate this new information and alter his arguments accordingly. It may well be that he will be able to once again make a case for anti-realist conclusions. 15 But there are reasons to suspect this task will be difficult. For unlike concepts, the action-guiding structures in terms of which objects are known can be directly compared with the actions it is indeed possible to take in the world, and the success or failure of these actions can be used to change the relevant representations. 16 This ability to directly measure the appropriateness of interpretive structures to the world they represent is precisely what is missing in (or denied by) the received view, and it is exactly (and only) this that the realist needs to make the case that the world can indeed provide epistemic friction sufficient to limit and guide our conceptions of it.
In the sections that remain, I would like to briefly elaborate this hypothesis regarding the structure of our epistemic cognition, focusing in particular on how the cooperation of different epistemic modes allows for the possibility that the concepts by and through which we understand the world are the mselves open to, and able to be influenced by, the world. 17 Since this possibility is intimately tied up with the epistemic import of acting in the world, we need first to have in place at least a provisional account of the nature of our knowledge of, and the means by which we monitor, our own actions.
Bodily awareness: two more kinds of knowing
Somatoception, our awareness of the state of our own bodies, breaks into three categories of two different epistemic types. There are bodily interoceptions (feelings of hunger or pain) and exteroceptions (experiences of touch), which are qualitative in character, and there is proprioception (awareness of the position and motion of our limbs), which appears to be non-qualitative. The difference between the three categories of somatoception is in their object: the perceived state of the body's interior in interoception, the perceived state of the external world in exteroception, and the perceived and/or non-qualitatively felt position and motion of the limbs in proprioception. However, following (O'Shaugnessy 1980; , the difference between the kinds of knowing involved in these categories of somatoception comes down to whether the object of the -ception is mediated by qualia. Thus a pain, a feeling of hunger, or the felt texture of a rug has a quality, but perceiving (knowing) one's limb position does not. In the latter case, the fact is merely given, and not necessarily consciously. This can be seen if one is suddenly thrown a ball-one doesn't need to attend to one's limb position before moving to catch the ball, rather, one's bodily position is constantly and unqualitatively given, and this informational state, whether attended to or not, is used in the calculation of the motion. Of course, one can become aware of position, but even so the position is given in awareness as a fact, not a qualitative feeling. [I]t is an experience, of the type attending, whose content is caused nondeviantly by its object, and it can form the basis of an inference to the existence of its object. Above all, it is no kind of cognitive attitude; even though, as befits perception, it causally sustains such, since one could in principle have this experience when one knows irrefutably that the bodily facts are other than they seem in the experience. In short, we have here an attentive experience in which a small sector of physical reality appears one way, which is to be sharply distinguished from cognitive attitudes of all kinds, even though it naturally sustains such. In a word, a perceiving. (p.176)
Even given these distinctions, it is clear that the types of somatoception must cooperate in various ways, and also with other categories of perception. Thus, knowledge of the position of one's limbs can be given in non-qualitative awareness, but also by touch (the feeling of the desk pressing against one's knees) and by vision (Ghez, Gordon and Ghilardi 1995) . Indeed, vision can sufficiently confound one's sense of limb position that it is apparently possible to locate-to feel-the touch of a feather in a clearly visible and strategically placed rubber arm, instead of in one's actual arm, which is being simultaneously touched but is hidden from view (Botvinick and Cohen 1998) . Likewise, a single touch can simultaneously give interoceptive information-a heat in one's finger-and exteroceptive information-the heat of the stove one is touching. And finally, it seems that certain kinds of tactile perception, e.g. feelings of texture, insofar as they involve not just contact between the sensing organ and the object, but also the motion of that organ, require both proprioceptive and tactile awareness. The fact of this cooperation is important to the current essay, but as the details are not, and are quite complex besides, further inquiry will be left for a future work.
What I do wish to draw attention to is the apparent existence of two more kinds of knowing, which do not seem to operate by the logic of the received view. 19 The first kind of knowing-and the one most important to the current essay-is of course nonqualitative proprioception. Again quoting O'Shaugnessy:
We stand to our limbs in a relation of awareness. A concrete or intuitional awareness. And since that awareness ceases when feeling ceases, and in despite of the fact that feeling is not its evidential ground, it must be a sensuous intuition. Then what information do we glean in being thus aware? We learn of the presence of the limb, and of such properties as that it is straight or moving away from one's body, i.e. of certain spatial properties of the limb. (O'Shaugnessy 1980, p. 167) For O'Shaugnessy, our awareness of our bodies is immediate and sensuous; he supposes the la tter because bodily awareness evidently requires the cooperation of our nervous system (severing the appropriate nerves will disrupt proprioceptive feedback), but it should be clear that, given the immediacy of the awareness, the necessary sensory impulses play only a causal, and not an epistemic role in bodily awareness. It is because of, but not through bodily sensations that one is aware of the limbs and their posture;
there is, in such awareness, nothing else to notice but the limb and its posture. No qualia intervene. "This immediate awareness, which is possible only because of feeling in the limb, we non-sense-perceptually characterize as 'being able to feel that it is flexed'."
(O'Shaugnessy 1980 p.217) What follows from this is that one important way of experiencing and monitoring our own actions is through this immediate non-qualitative awareness; we have immediate and non-qualitiative access to the current positional state of our bodies, and hence to the progress of ongoing activity. As will be explained in more detail below, this gives us the ability to compare expectations for actiongenerated, for instance, as a result of one's identification of an object as being in a particular place and of a particular type, from which it follows that a given intervention will produce a certain result-with the actual outcome of action. Success or failure of action, then, can be used to question or confirm the validity of one's perception. Indeedand this speculation is at the center of the next section-suc h feedback can perhaps even, by allowing one to make adjustments to the concepts involved in perceptual organization, actually change the character of one's perception.
The second kind of knowing is that identified as the qualitative element of somatoception. This kind of perception at first blush seems to operate identically to the received view: in touch, for instance, elements of the world can be known and categorized in terms of publicly available concepts. Indeed, one can certainly perceive there to be an apple or a sphere in one's hand, and there is not likely to be a quale for an apple or a sphere; rather the experience is organized under, and experienced in terms of, these conceptual structures. At the same time, however, heat, cold, texture, and pain seem to be distinguishable from each other, and divisible into internal categories, not in terms of conceptual structures like these, but rather in terms of qualitative features of the experience.
If I see a dagger before me I do indeed perceive the dagger. I do not feel that it is a dagger, nor do I judge that it is so based on qualitiative evidence. 20 I perform no postperceptual manipulation or arrangement of qualia into a dagger-like mental object; this is not how perception works. Rather, perception makes the dagger present to mind, and that it is a dagger is a given feature of my experience. On the other side of the coin, I do feel its sharpness, and the coldness of its steel, and these (along with, perhaps, its silvery sheen 21 ) are identifiable qualities that are likewise part of my experience of the dagger.
What this suggests is that experience has not just conceptual or categorical, but qualitative features; and these features represent different aspects of our consciousness of objects. Further, it may be that each such feature of experience is a sign of a different facet of our epistemic sensitivity to the world.
Note that what has been said above does not amount simply to a restatement of classical empiricism. That doctrine envisioned the existence of a set of basic sensual qualia, from which a picture of the world would be constructed. I make no claim that there is any level of pure experience consisting of raw feels, pure qualia, or the like, which is epistemically basic or the primal, pre-conceptual product of perception. Nor should what I have said here be construed to imply even that there are some sensory modalities that deliver, in isolation and without cognitive processing, a stream of pure qualia. First, it may well be that it is only in cooperation with other elements of perception, and the context they provide, that qualities can be experienced and understood; thus, for instance, it appears that the experience of a pain or a tickle requires the proprioceptively rooted sense of the spatial characteristics of one's body. It is evidently not possible to feel an itch in a place that does not at least seem to be part of one's body. 22 Likewise, we may not, in general, be able to experience a quality-red-without it seeming to be the quality of something-the fire engine. In this case the experience of red would require the cooperation of qualitative and conceptual processing. 23 Further, qualitative elements of perception may be the result of high-level processing mechanisms every bit as complex as those involved in conceptual or categorical perception. The suggestion that the qualitative aspect of experience is different from the conceptual, and exploits different features of sensory input, does not imply that it is simpler, purer, or more accurately reflects the basic nature of that sensory input. And finally, the notion of pure qualia generally implies a nonintentional component of experience, a pure "feel" that has no intrinsic connection to any property in or element of the world. What is being posited here, in contrast, is that what is given in perception is, in some cases conceptually mediated information about the state world, and in other cases qualitatively mediated information. Likewise, perception can provide action-oriented information, and in at least one case, unmediated awareness of the state of one very special part of the world:
one's own body. There is simply no suggestion in any of these cases that perceptual experience is essentially (or even largely) nonintentional.
Because it is a central purpose of this essay to suggest that human knowers employ more than one, and perhaps many, epistemic modes, I have tried to suggest a number of possibilities for what these modes might be. I have identified four candidates so far:
cognitive-conceptual perception, exemplified by ventral stream visual processing; qualitative perception, exemplified by touch; action-guiding perception, exemplified by dorsal stream visual processing; and a special kind of unmediated awareness of bodily position and motion, provided by proprioception. 24 I am aware that some of these suggestions may be controversial, and that establishing all of them would require far more time and careful argument that I have provided here. Still, I think the general idea of multi-modal epistemic openness to the world is sound, even if one or another of my particular suggestions must be abandoned. And in any case, it is only to the existence of the latter two epistemic modes that the central thesis of this essay is committed. Thus it is to these modes of epistemic access to the world, and their postulated significance, that I turn in the next, concluding, section.
Conclusion: the multiple modes theory of epistemic openness
It is of course obvious that most of our information about the state of, and goings-on in the world are the result of the complex cooperation of our various sensory modalities.
What I have suggested, in addition, is that we are possessed of multiple epistemic modes-I have proposed four candidates-and that cooperation between the various epistemic modes can account for our openness to the world, and the ability of the world to limit and guide our conceptions of it. As I mentioned already above, there mere existence of non-conceptually mediated epistemic modes is enough to block, at least temporarily, the anti-realist arguments with which we began this essay. Insofar as this is correct, the main argumentative responsibility of the essay has already been discharged.
Nevertheless, the case would undoubtedly be stronger were I able to provide a concrete illustration of how such cooperation might work, and thereby begin to construct a substantial alternative to the received view, and its implication of our cognitive confinement. Thus I will end with one particular, highly speculative, suggestion as to how cooperation between VS visual processing, DS visual processing, and proprioception might allow the possibility of determining the appropriateness of a concept or set of concepts to the world.
Let it first be stipulated that it is a central role of (at least some) concepts to provide guidance for behavior. I take this to be uncontroversial, so far as it goes, and it is not meant to contradict any claim that their central role is to structure perceptual experience, or model the environment. Indeed, on my view, it is largely in virtue of their role in guiding behavior that concepts structure perceptual experience (O'Donovan-Anderson 1997; Anderson 2003a; 2003b) . In any case, the concepts that do provide guidance for interacting with the physical objects 25 that fall under them, do so in virtue of such connections with or information about the repertoire of actions available to the agent, and the relevant action-related properties of the object, as will allow the agent to make appropriate decisions about which actions to take under the circumstances to produce the desired outcomes. Again, I take the sentiment (if not the details of its expression) to be obvious and uncontroversial. Something like this must be the case, insofar as actions are guided by concepts. But we have yet to put this observation in the context of the current essay; doing so marks the beginning of admittedly controversial speculation.
Given the different roles served by the two visual streams, it is hypothesized that the action-guiding function of concepts is achieved in virtue of dorsal stream (posterior parietal cortex) representations or equivalents of the same concepts. Use or task related cognitive-conceptual information could perhaps be represented in the posterior parietal cortex in terms of a specific set of (task relative) associations between standard motor schemas (Jeannerod 1997) . We have, of course, been focusing primarily on the evidence for the differences in function between DS-related and VS-related representations.
However, there is evidence to the effect that certain actions-for instance posting a complex shape through a matching slot-require that both dorsal and ventral stream representations of the relevant objects cooperate . It might be reasonable to hypothesize further that these two required representations are essentially connected and will co-vary in learning/concept change.
26
It is important to keep in mind that how concepts are represented in the brain is not well understood, and I am not committing myself to any particular model here. The basic thought is that the high-level cognitive-conceptual structures of the occipital cortex might have use or task-related information associated with the m-whether as a whole or as a result of their own construction from more basic conceptual elements such as mental models, feature sets, semantic relations, and the like-and that this information could be reflected in, or even stored as a set of equivalent associations among the basic motor schemas stored in the parietal cortex and motor areas. In point of fact, I know of no explicit evidence either for or against this hypothesis, but it seems that, if concepts do provide guidance for action, and if acquiring and adjusting our concepts involves changes (say) both to a concept's inferential role or cognitive contents and to its action-guiding role, and if, further, changes to its inferential role or cognitive contents can have implications for its action guidance (and vice versa), and if, finally, action guidance is handled by (and in terms of) dorsal stream processes and representations, and inference by (and in terms of) ventral stream processes and representations, then one reasonable mechanism to account fo r the coordination of all these elements, is that concepts are stored as distributed representations, with dorsal stream (action-related) and ventral stream (cognition-related) elements, which elements are closely connected and covarying. In any case, I offer this as a speculative but testable hypothesis as to one kind of cooperation between dorsal and ventral stream processing-the maintenance of distributed conceptual structures with both dorsal and ventral elements, supposed to be active in each case in the structuring of perceptual information as processed by these two perceptual streams.
It is at this point that we are in a position to see how different epistemic modes might cooperate to transmit epistemic friction from the world to the relevant conceptual structures. For let us suppose that a given agent has, in his acquisition of the concept 'lead', somehow not gathered that it is very dense. This agent, seeing a lead ball (say 28 inches in diameter) and, being an avid soccer player, knowing that balls are good for kicking, may well decide to kick this ball into the nearby (conveniently placed) net.
Having decided to do this, the continuing real-time guidance of the action will be handled by DS processes. The relevant motor representations for 'ball' direct his kick in such a way that a certain spot of the top of his foot will contact a particular spot between the ball's equator and the ground. At the same time, the motor information associated with 'lead' give an estimate of the muscle force that will be required for the ball to reach the goal. Thus the agent kicks the ball, hard. 27 Let us assume, out of compassion for our agent, that he does not break his foot. Nevertheless, the action will of course fail; his foot will stop before he expects, and the ball will not move. The agent will be immediately, non-qualitatively aware of the failure of his bodily motion; the actual trajectory and ending position of his kick can be directly compared with that expected in virtue of the chosen motor schema. 28 This failure will suggest the inappropriateness of the chosen motor schema, 29 which in turn will change the action-guiding content of the relevant concepts, which (by earlier hypothesis) will alter its inferential content. 'Lead', that is, will come to imply dense, or heavy. Now, of course, this process, described here so briefly, is likely to be quite complex, and may well involve further explorations or the testing of provisional hypotheses by our surprised agent (he may try to pick up or roll the ball, or kick a different ball, or some such). But the point here is not to suggest a general theory of learning, nor to provide any details about how, exactly, learning in this case would take place (although the fact that quite complex learning can take place guided just by positive and negative feedback, in the form, for instance, of task success and failure (Sutton and Barto 1998) , is certainly worth mentioning).
Rather, the point is to establish the possibility, against many years and pages of theorizing to the contrary, that such concept change can indeed not only take place (the various coherentist and internalist theories of course allow for that possibility, and the story told above is not incompatible with those) but that this change can be directly attributed to the (not conceptually mediated) influence of the (not conceptually interpreted) world. It may indeed not be possible to "step outside" our conceptual structures to see the world as it "really is"; but neither does this imagined direct confrontation between concepts and the bare structure of the world appear to be necessary to make the claim that we know the world, and that the concepts in terms of which we express this knowledge are grounded in our contact with that world. Naturally, acting in the world is not seeing it, and the proprioceptive information provided in virtue of our physical encounter with that world is not conceptually or cognitively rich. But insofar as it provides even the minimal information required to determine the success or failure of an action (and that it does at least this is not speculation; the role of proprioceptive monitoring in governing action adjustment and repetition in light of failure is well documented) it is nevertheless sufficient to drive concept correction and change and, in doing this, to establish our epistemic openness to the physical structure of the world.
Notes
1 Nöe and Thompson comment: "What is given to us, one might suppose, is not the world itself, but the pattern of light on the retina, and that pattern does not supply enough information to determine how things are in the environment. For example, from the retinal image of a table alone, it may not be possible to tell whether it is large and far away, or small and nearby. . . .In the face of this puzzle an orthodox or 'Establishment View' of perception (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 2002) has taken shape over the last fifty years.
According to this orthodoxy, perception is a process whereby the brain, or a functionally dedicated subsystem of the brain, builds up representations of relevant features of the environment on the basis of information encoded by sensory receptors. As David Marr (2002) puts it: 'Vision is a process of discovering from images what is present in the world, and where it is.' Because the patterns on the retina are not sufficient by themselves to determine the layout of the surrounding environment, perception must be thought of as a process of inductive inference. Perceptions are, as Richard Gregory (2002) suggests, hypotheses concerning the distal causes of proximal stimulation. In the famous phrase of Helmholtz, perception is unconscious inference." (Nöe and Thompson 2002b p.4-5) 2 Rorty again: "Since Kant, we find it almost impossible not to think of the mind as divided into active and passive faculties, the former using concepts to "interpret" what "the world" imposes on the latter. . . . But as soon as we have this picture in mind it occurs to us, as it did to Hegel, that those all important a priori concepts, those which determine what our experience or our morals will be, might have been diffe rent. . . . The possibility of different conceptual schemes highlights the fact that a Kantian unsynthesized intuition can exert no influence on how it is to be synthesized-or, at best, can exert an influence we shall have to describe in a way . . . relative to a chosen conceptual scheme. . . . Insofar as a Kantian intuition is effable it is just a perceptual judgment, and thus not merely "intuitive." Insofar as it is ineffable, it is incapable of having an explanatory function. This dilemma . . . casts doubt on the notion of a faculty of "receptivity." There seems no need to postulate an intermediary between the physical thrust of the stimulus upon the organ and the full-fledged conscious judgment that the properly programmed organism forms in consequence" (Rorty 1979 p.3-4) 3 This is the upshot of (Quine 1985) and (Davidson 1985) . What Quine and Davidson deny is that, prior to conceptual synthesis, sensation has qualities which can be experienced non-cognitively as such; it is to deny that (again, prior to cognitive interpretation) experience has what Rorty calls "raw feels" in terms of which we can access, or get some phenomenological handle on, our sensory experience. Quine and Davidson do not claim that our experience has no phenomenological content (that there is nothing it "feels like" to touch wet grass); instead they argue that whatever wet grass "feels like"-whatever the content of this experience-no stimulation of our sensory receptors warrants the name "experience" except that which is conceptually structured. 4 And unless we want to return to classical empiricism, to the notion that sensation could have the epistemic content necessary to effect conceptual change, the missing account of the world's epistemic friction (of our epistemic openness) must look to resources outside of sensation. For on this picture, the sensations through which alone the world contacts us can never "boil over" (in James' apt phrase) to "make us correct our present formulations." Anomalous experience is by definition impossible, for even anomalies must be conceptualized if they are be coherent as experience, and in particular if they are to be conceptualized with enough depth to be understood as inconsistent with some theory under consideration. Confronted with an anomaly, then, we do not have the option of conforming a theory more closely to pure experience (or the world it reflects), but only more closely to another theory-the one within which the anomaly was conceptualized. It may seem at first glance as if this apparent ability to drive internal theory replacement is a sufficient account of the world's epistemic friction. Except, we must ask: whence come these rival theories? They cannot (by definition) be built from unconceptualized sensation; but nor does it make sense to say they are guided by experience, for experience is already, on this view "theory laden" and so comprehensible in terms of some already existing, perceptually active conceptual structure. Thus, the most that experience can do is drive the increasing internal coherence of the conceptual structures with which one happens to be initially equipped. This ability is not without its value, of course, but it is hardly a substitute for genuine epistemic openness to the world. For a more detailed account of the challenge of anti-realism and the requirements for realism, see (O'Donovan-Anderson 1997) . 5 More precisely, I argue that on this view it is impossible to account for the possibility of intentionality, our ability to be cognitively in touch with material particulars, and that such an account is one of the requirements for realism. 6 Actually, not everyone is reluctant. A significant number of anti-realists actually embrace the conclusion as liberating (using phrases like "the tyranny of facts"), but I've never seen the sense in this. For (on this view) where structures of belief, and thus conceptions of the world compete, no appeal to a neutral set of facts or observations can possibly be grounds for deciding between them. Instead, all conflicts of this sort must be decided by-and must be perceived as requiring-the exercise of power, whether or not constrained by social institutions. It should be noted how much more radical this is than anything Thomas Kuhn supported; it strikes me as not merely mistaken, but dangerous. The appeal to facts-and the option of acceding to them-plays an extremely important role in settling interpersonal (and intercultural) disputes. The handling of the AIDS crisis by the South African government-which has cast the problem in terms of Africa vs. the West, and rejected available treatments and the science behind them in part because of their "western" origin and (thus) presumed bias-is one example of the devastating practical consequences of the notion that there are no facts, only artifacts constructed in terms of one's culturalconceptual resources (cf. Power 2003) . 7 At this point in the argument, Peter Carruthers has raised the following questions: Is it really necessary to postulate another mode of epistemic access to the world to avoid anti-realism? Why can't one point, for example, to the evidence of innate conceptual structure, and to the argument from evolutionary psychology that such structures will have been selected for precisely because they at least approxi mate to the causal structure of the world in which the organism operates? I answer: What I am claiming is first, that without an account of how the world can influence and direct whatever structures are implicated in the production of perceptual content, the anti-realist argument has all it needs to move forward, and second, that no such account is available on the received view (see, e.g. fn. 4). In this light, it is quite true that the various naturalistic/evolutionary accounts of epistemology can be construed as offering the missing account. Note, however, that it is not clear that in doing so they preserve the uni-modal epistemic assumption of the received view. For selection pressure can be construed as another kind of epistemic friction-another mode of epistemic openness to the world, the mechanisms of which work directly and slowly on the (for instance) innate conceptual structures implicated in generating perceptual content from sensory stimulations.
On the other side of the coin, one problem with the evolutionary approaches is the assumption that the innate structures that are thereby selected are just those that approximate the real causal structure of the world. What is the justification for supposing this? That accurate structures are most likely to give the overall best performance? Yet, we are far from being optimal beings; and in so far as we are modular (generally an assumption of evolutionary accounts of mind), there is less likely to be a need for any "overall" best performance; each function carried out by the organism uses local resources and assumptions tailored to that specific task. That is to say, the narrower one draws the domain, the more likely that one can get very good performance while just "preserving the phenomena"; without the test of fertility or crossdomain applicability, the claim that the way you get good performance is by approximating real underlying causal structure looks more tenuous. This line of questioning may undermine the first point above, as the logic by which selection works cannot, perhaps, be rightly called epistemic, i.e. truth-preserving, nor should we therefore expect this of the sensory mechanisms which result (on this point see (Akins 1996) ).
It is an interesting debate, to which I am doing little justice here. Better accounts of the debate and its consequences can be found, for instance, in (Bradie 1994; Radnitzky and Bartley 1993) . But the eventual outcome of this debate does not, so far as I can tell, significantly affect the arguments of the current essay. If selection pressure emerges as another mode of epistemic openness to the world, so much the better for my overall project, to argue for our possession of multiple-and perhaps even very manyepistemic modes. On the other hand, if selection pressure fails on some grounds to qualify as a mode of epistemic openness to the world, this failure does not necessarily undermine the status of any other proposed mode of epistemic openness to the world. 8 I argued, in essence, that bodily activity, tracked and known through proprioception, allowed the possibility that concepts, in so far as they standardly provide guidance for acting in the world, could be refined and modified in virtue of the success or failure of the actions in question. See also (Anderson 2003b; Rosenberg and Anderson forthcoming) . 9 Closer attention to (Gibson 1966; 1977) might have helped avoid this error, as he suggests that vision, as with the other senses, has both exteroceptive and proprioceptive elements. 10 The anatomical differentiation is of course much more complex and interesting than this characterization suggests. For the details the reader is encouraged to consult (Milner and Goodale 1995) , chapter 2. 11 Likewise, each stream is involved in spatial processing. Thus, the specialization of the two systems must be understood in terms of their functional roles, and not in terms of the "sort" of processing they do, abstractly defined. For a recent example the "what" and "where" systems hypothesis, which sits uneasily with the Milner and Goodale position, see (Hurford 2003) . Hurford argues that the "where" pathway might function to fix a spatially -coded reference (or deictic pointer) to an object, which could serve as the foundation of the variable (x) in predicate(x) structure. One question worth asking Hurford in light of the Milner-Goodale position is: "Which 'where' pathway"? For a different criticism of Hurford, but driven by similar considerations, see (Anderson and Oates 2003) . 12 Presumably, creating more complex renditions of these objects -for instance, including a leaf on the stem of an apple-would involve form recognition. In order to know where to put the leaf, one must know what one is looking at and how it is oriented, which DF does not. 13 Interestingly, although she performed well on the mail slot task, when posting a 'T'-shaped object into a matching slot, her performance deteriorated to 50%, with the failed attempts almost always off by 90 degrees from the correct orientation ). This appears to indicate that she is using only one element of the 'T' to guide her posting behavior, and is unable to combine the two elements into an entire oriented shape. One reason this is interesting is it suggests the importance of cooperation between dorsal and ventral stream processing in some visuomotor tasks. In contrast, DF's ability to accurately grasp complex shapes is unimpaired, indicating that grasping ability is isolated to the dorsal stream. 14 Note, once again, that this modeling includes spatial as well as conceptual elements. It is not just that objects are recognized, but they are seen as oriented and in relation to other objects and to the self. 15 There is, of course, a movement called 'the new scepticism' (Nöe 2002b) which, on the basis of some interesting findings in the psychology of vision (e.g. change blindness) and our susceptibility to visual illusions, argues for a strong constructivist (and therefore anti-realist) account of perception. I believe that the considerations I advance here go some distance in answering the challenge of the new skepticism, but I will not give that argument in the current essay. For a review of the subject see (Nöe 2002a) , and for some arguments against the new scepticism compatible (so far as I can see) with my own, see (Nöe 2002b) . 16 This general thesis that acting in the world can guide conceptual change is hardly new. See, for instance, (James 1912; Peirce 1955; 1958; Hacking 1983) . However, the pragmatist notion was that action increased experience, and their concept of experience was still too closely tied to the classical empiricist notion of sense data to allow them to side-step anti-realist arguments. For the details of this account of Pragmatism see (O'Donovan-Anderson 1997, ch. 3) . What I am proposing, in contrast, is that there is more than one kind of experience, and that acting in the world exploits these other modes of knowing. 17 Some elements of this hypothesis were introduced in (O'Donovan-Anderson 1997) and (Anderson 2003b) . A much more complete account will be given in (Rosenberg and Anderson forthcoming) 18 Likewise with bodily extent and shape-these are given as facts, not feelings, unmediated by quality, and are the basis for such things as the calculation of motion. A good account of the nature and origin of the body schema is given in (O'Shaugnessy 1980; Note that the body schema is not the same thing as the body image, which is cognitive in nature, with this kind of self-perception mediated by concepts and qualities. The body image can play a role in conscious choices (eating behaviors, for instance), and is subject to a unique set of pathologies. Phantom limb phenomena are pathologies of the body schema, anorexia of the body image (Gallagher 1986) . 19 For those who find anatomical evidence convincing, it turns out that not only are there different sets of receptors for heat/cold, texture, and limb position and motion, but what I am calling qualitiative somatoception (heat/cold, texture) is processed by a different pathway fro m non-qualitiative somatoception (proprioception). Among other differences, touch is importantly cortical, while proprioception is importantly spinocerebellar, although it integrates with other sensory modalities at a cortical level (Sommer and Wurtz 2002; Nicolelis et al. 1998; Craig and Rolman 1999; Bosco and Poppele 2001) . 20 A word about vocabulary: when I talk about feelings, I mean those features of our perceptual experience that are possessed of quality. I make no claim for the autonomy of qualia; they are not the pre-existing building blocks of experience; they are not experience per se, nor the pure 'pre-conceptual' products of our sense organs. I am claiming only that they are one identifiable feature of-one class of object to be found in-our experience. I use "perception" to refer to the entire range of our epistemic and informationgathering interaction with the world. The product of perception is not qualia, pure or otherwise; it is our experience-our consciousness-of the world. However, I believe that each such feature of experience is a sign of a different facet of our epistemic sensitivity to the world. 21 Actually, I have no considered judgment regarding whether vision has, in addition to the modes already discussed, yet another, qualitative mode-exemplified, for instance, by color vision. For a discussion see (Thompson 1995) . The main thesis of the current essay does not require the hypothesis that vision has a qualitative mode-nor, for that matter, does it require that any sensory modality possesses a qualitative mode. What does matter is that there is at least one epistemic mode other than that described by the received view, and that it be conceptually unmediated in its contact with the world. It is further necessary to my particular speculations that this mode be operative in bodily activity. 22 "Bodily sensations cause an awareness of themselves as set in a specific position in a determinately postured limb, and simultaneously those same sensations cause awareness of the very limb, and as determinately postured, in which they themselves come as seemingly set." (O'Shaugnessy 1980 p.204 ) Given that we can experience such sensations at any, but only at some, place on a seeming body (and recalling that it is not by and through having such sensations at given points on our bodies that we are aware of the body) we can postulate the existence of an always already present seeming body, which provides the framework or substrate for bodily perception, and is the object of bodily awareness. This is the body schema. In its short-term manifestation, it consists of an awareness of one's current posture; in its long-term manifestation it consists of a sense of the persisting spatio-structural features of one's body, thus not current postures, but possible ones. 23 In general, as Merleau-Ponty puts it: sensation is always "a formation already bound up with a larger whole, already endowed with a meaning . . ." (Merleau-Ponty 1962 p.9; see also Thompson 1995 ch. 5) 24 These different epistemic modes cut across different sensory modalities; in addition to possible cases of one-to-one correspondence between epistemic mode and sensory modality, a given sensory modality may employ more than one epistemic mode, and a given epistemic mode may require the cooperation of more than one sensory modality. 25 Concepts can also provide guidance for dealing with abstract entities, e.g. numbers. This possibility is left aside here, but it is not thereby ruled out. 26 Although , of course, does not establis h this connection nor any degree of covariance. 27 The similarity of this example to Dr. Johnson's refutation of Berkeley is intentional. I've often thought that this refutation was unjustly maligned-for the notion that Johnson's performative argument is a nonstarter depends on the assumption that the epistemic import or result of the kick is the production of more sense data. But this needn't be the case. Kicking is indeed a kind of touching, which is indeed a kind of perception; but not all perception operates in the manner supposed by Berkeley. 28 In addition, of course, there will be unexpected qualitative experience (pain), and visual experience (the stationary ball), which each might contribute in their own way to a reconsideration of the relevant concepts. 29 In this instance in a rather radical way, but we have all experienced cases where our visual expectation of the weight of something had to be adjusted when we actually attempted to pick it up, lest we throw it through the ceiling.
